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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
 The District Court barred a retrial of and dismissed the 
indictment against Defendant Raymont Wright with prejudice 
after two juries failed to reach a verdict.  The Court did so 
relying on its inherent authority, but without finding that any 
misconduct had occurred or that Wright would suffer any 
prejudice beyond the general anxiety and inconvenience of 
facing a retrial.  Under such circumstances, the Court lacked 
the inherent authority to bar the retrial and dismiss the 
indictment.  Therefore, we will reverse the order dismissing the 
indictment and remand for further proceedings.   
 
I 
 
 In December 2014, Wright was charged with being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).  He pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial in 
May 2016.  The jury was unable to reach a verdict.  A second 
trial was held in March 2017, and that jury was also unable to 
reach a verdict.   
 
 During both trials, the jury heard evidence from police 
officers about Wright’s actions on July 24, 2014.1  That 
evening, five Pittsburgh Police detectives were patrolling in 
two unmarked cars.  Detectives Kennedy, Henson, and Baker 
were in the lead car, and Detectives Fallert and Goob were in 
the second car.  Around 8:30 p.m. (when it was still daylight), 
Fallert and Goob saw a man, later identified as Wright, driving 
                                              
 1 The following facts are drawn largely from the 
evidence presented at the first trial. 
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a car in the opposite direction well above the 25-mile-per-hour 
speed limit.  The detectives turned around to follow Wright, 
and Wright sped up and turned onto a loop-shaped road.  The 
detectives pursued Wright, who fled at a high speed and ran at 
least four stop signs.  The lead car lost sight of Wright shortly 
thereafter and discontinued pursuit.   
 
 Officers in the lead car then noticed skid marks 
suggesting that a car had intended but failed to make a left turn 
at the end of a street.  Officers thereafter came upon Wright’s 
car in a parking lot below.  The car had gone through a fence, 
over a hillside, and into the lot.  The car hit two unoccupied 
parked cars, its tires blew out, and its windows were down.   
 
 Detectives Baker and Henson exited the vehicle at the 
top of the hill and remained where Wright’s car broke through 
the fence, and Detective Kennedy drove his car down to the 
parking lot’s entrance.  Baker and Henson testified that they 
saw Wright search around the rear passenger seat of the car, 
back out of the vehicle with a black semi-automatic handgun 
in his right hand, and try to “rack the slide,” which can insert 
or remove a round from the chamber.  App. 118-19.  They had 
their weapons drawn and told Wright to drop the gun.  At first, 
Wright merely stepped back, but he eventually tossed the gun 
to the side, backed away, and lied on the ground.  Pittsburgh 
police officer Elliott and his partner, who heard of the crash on 
the radio, were the first to reach Wright, and saw him lying on 
the ground with a handgun next to him.  Henson stated that 
when he made it down to the parking lot, he heard Wright say 
to him, “Hey, big guy.  You won this time or you won this 
round, something of that nature.  He [Wright] said: You feel 
me?  You won this time,” which Henson understood to mean 
that he had just avoided a shootout or that he caught Wright 
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after the pursuit.  App. 125.  Henson subsequently took custody 
of the gun and noticed the slide lever was bent, and when he 
straightened it, saw the gun was loaded with eight rounds, and 
one in the chamber.2   
 
 At the close of the Government’s case, Wright moved 
for a directed verdict, arguing that no reasonable juror could 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright possessed the 
firearm.  The District Court denied the motion because “the 
evidence does thus far demonstrate that a reasonable juror 
could most certainly find the Defendant guilty of the charge in 
this case.”  App. 171.  Wright did not present a case.     
 
 The jury deliberated for approximately five hours and 
then reported to the Court that it was deadlocked.  After polling 
the jurors to confirm they were deadlocked and further 
deliberations would not bring them closer to a unanimous 
verdict, the District Court declared a mistrial.   
 
 At Wright’s March 2017 retrial, the Government 
presented substantially the same evidence.  The Government 
also called Detective Kennedy and Lieutenant Palermo, who 
were at the scene after Wright was arrested, as well as experts 
who testified regarding the collection of DNA and fingerprint 
evidence from firearms to respond to Wright’s argument at the 
first trial that investigators chose not to test the gun for forensic 
evidence in an effort to cover up that they had planted the gun 
at the scene.   
 
                                              
2 The parties stipulated Wright had been convicted of a 
qualifying felony, and an ATF Special Agent testified about 
the gun’s interstate nexus.   
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 At the close of the Government’s case, Wright again 
moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the Court denied 
because “there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wright possessed the 
firearm in the case,” App. 650.  Wright did not put on a case.  
 
 The second jury deliberated for approximately three 
hours and then reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked.  The 
Court polled the jury to confirm the deadlock and then 
dismissed the jury.3   
 
 After the Government notified the Court that it intended 
to retry the case, the Court required the parties to brief 
“whether the Court, through an exercise of its inherent 
authority, should prohibit or permit a second re-trial in this 
case.”  App. 26.  After considering the parties’ arguments, the 
District Court dismissed the indictment with prejudice, holding 
that it “ha[d] the inherent authority, under some circumstances, 
to dismiss an indictment following multiple mistrials.”  United 
States v. Wright, Crim. A. No. 14-292, 2017 WL 1179006, at 
*4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017).  It reasoned that: (1) principles 
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause also applied to a 
defendant facing a retrial after multiple mistrials, id. at *1-2; 
(2) other courts had dismissed indictments in similar 
                                              
3 Wright asserted that in the first trial, jurors voted 8-4 
for acquittal, and in the second trial, the jury was evenly split.  
The Government asserted that in the first trial, jurors voted 7-
5 for acquittal, and in the second trial, voted 8-4 for conviction.  
See United States v. Wright, Crim. A. No. 14-292, 2017 WL 
1179006, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017).  While Wright does 
not explain how he obtained these numbers, the Government 
said it obtained them by speaking with the jurors.   
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circumstances, id. at *2-3 (citing United States v. Rossoff, 806 
F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (C.D. Ill. 1992); United States v. Ingram, 
412 F. Supp. 384, 385 (D.D.C. 1976); Sivels v. State, 741 
N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ind. 2001); State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 
517 (N.J. 1985); State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712-13 
(Haw. 1982); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tenn. 
1978)); (3) while Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(b)(3) 
expressly allows the Government to retry a case after a mistrial, 
nothing in the rule “limits a court’s inherent supervisory 
authority to dismiss an indictment in the interests of 
fundamental fairness,” id. at *4; and (4) if the Court were to 
adopt the Government’s position that there are no limit to the 
number of times the Government can retry a defendant, it 
would be tantamount to a “type of jury shopping” that a court 
should not permit, id. at *4.  The District Court also considered 
the factors set forth in Abbati, 493 A.2d at 521-22, and 
concluded that most factors supported dismissal.4  
                                              
4 The Abbati factors are 
 
 (1) the number of prior mistrials and the 
outcome of the juries’ deliberations, so far as is 
known; (2) the character of prior trials in terms 
of length, complexity, and similarity of evidence 
presented; (3) the likelihood of any substantial 
difference in a subsequent trial, if allowed; 
(4) the trial court’s own evaluation of the relative 
strength of each party’s case; and (5) the 
professional conduct and diligence of respective 
counsel, particularly of the prosecuting attorney.  
The court must also give due weight to the 
prosecutor’s decision to reprosecute, assessing 
the reasons for that decision, such as the gravity 
8 
The Government appeals. 
II5 
 
 We review the District Court’s order dismissing the 
indictment based on the Court’s inherent power for abuse of 
discretion.6  See United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 
                                              
of the criminal charges and the public’s concern 
in the effective and definitive conclusion of 
criminal prosecutions.  Conversely, the court 
should accord careful consideration to the status 
of the individual defendant and the impact of a 
retrial upon the defendant in terms of untoward 
hardship and unfairness. 
 
Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *4 (quoting Abbati, 493 A.2d 
at 521-22).  For the reasons set forth herein, we would not 
adopt Abbati, but even if we were to consider the Abbati 
factors, we would conclude that they do not support dismissal 
in this case.   
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731. 
6 The phrases “inherent power,” “inherent authority,” 
“supervisory power,” and “supervisory authority” are all used 
to describe the basis for a court action seeking to maintain the 
integrity of the proceedings that is not directly tethered to a 
specific rule, statute, or constitutional provision.  See, e.g., 
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (inherent 
power); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992) 
(supervisory power); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 
43 (1991) (inherent power); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
9 
1084-88, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing dismissal of 
indictment for abuse of discretion); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (reviewing a court’s imposition of 
sanctions under its inherent power for abuse of discretion); 
Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“A trial court’s remedy for a discovery violation under 
its supervisory powers is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).  
A district court abuses its discretion when it makes an errant 
conclusion of law, an improper application of law to fact, or a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact.  McDowell v. Phila. Hous. 
Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
A 
 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31 allows the 
Government to retry a case if the court declares a mistrial after 
a jury announces it is unable to reach a verdict.  Specifically, 
Rule 31(b)(3) provides: “[i]f the jury cannot agree on a verdict 
on one or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on 
those counts.  The government may retry any defendant on any 
count on which the jury could not agree.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
31(b)(3).  The word “may” means that the Government has the 
                                              
States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-56, 263 (1988) (supervisory 
authority); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) 
(supervisory power); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 
733-36 (1980) (supervisory power); United States v. Nobles, 
422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (inherent power). 
Even if we accepted the distinctions our dissenting 
colleague has drawn between inherent judicial powers, 
legislatively granted judicial powers, and supervisory powers, 
each category must operate within the constitutional 
framework, including the separation of powers. 
10 
discretion to retry a case, and nothing in the rule or its 
commentary provides or even suggests a limit on the number 
of retrials it may conduct.  See United States v. Wqas Khan, 
No. 2:10-CR-0175 KJM, 2014 WL 1330681, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 
Apr. 1, 2014) (“Nothing suggests that multiple mistrials take a 
case out of the Rule’s operation.”), appeal dismissed, No. 14-
10218 (9th Cir. July 9, 2014).7  Moreover, there is nothing in 
                                              
7 While Rule 31 does not limit the Government’s 
authority to retry a case, a handful of district courts have 
dismissed indictments following a second hung jury, but those 
decisions are not persuasive.  In Ingram, the district court 
dismissed the indictment sua sponte (without any initial 
objection by the Government) after two mistrials—in which 
jurors had voted 10-2 and 11-1 for acquittal, the defendant was 
jailed during the pendency of the trials, and “[t]he Government 
ha[d] no new proof; it simply want[ed] another chance.”  412 
F. Supp. at 385.  The court concluded that to permit a retrial 
would be “to ignore the reasonable doubt standard,” and so 
“[t]he Court’s intervention [was] required in the interest of 
justice.”  Id. at 386 (citing United States v. De Diego, 511 F.2d 
818, 824 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975); De Diego, 511 F.2d at 833 n.6 
(McGowan, J., dissenting)).  The Ingram court, however, relied 
in part on the dissent in De Diego.  Cases since Ingram have 
applied the De Diego majority’s view concerning a court’s 
limited authority to dismiss an indictment.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing 
De Diego and reversing the district court’s dismissal of the 
indictment where the district court found it would be 
“unconscionable” to retry to the defendant); United States v. 
Hudson, 545 F.2d 724, 724-26 (10th Cir. 1976) (discussing De 
Diego and its dissent and holding a district court does not have 
authority to sua sponte dismiss an indictment based on the 
11 
                                              
defendant’s poor health); United States v. Mussehl, 453 F. 
Supp. 1235, 1236 (D.N.D. 1978) (denying defendants’ motion 
to dismiss the indictment based on alleged errors at trial, and 
citing De Diego for the proposition that “[t]he duty [to 
administer justice] encompasses the concept of review of the 
question whether the United States Attorney, in making his 
decision to prosecute, complied with the law, but does not 
allow the Court to question a United States Attorney’s 
judgment decision to prosecute, when lawfully made”). 
The District Court also relied on Rossoff, where the 
court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss the 
indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), 
but still dismissed the indictment with prejudice.  806 F. Supp. 
at 202-03 (citing Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385-86).  There had 
been two trials, and the Government sought to dismiss the 
indictment and refile the charges in a different judicial district.  
Id.  The court determined it had authority to dismiss an 
indictment with prejudice if a retrial was “against the concept 
of fundamental fairness,” id. at 202 (citing Ingram, 412 F. 
Supp. 384), and did so because, among other reasons, the 
defendant was in poor health, was under significant strain, and 
a majority of jurors at both trials found him not guilty, id. at 
203.  Rossoff, however, is distinguishable from Wright’s case 
because in Rossoff, the Government sought to dismiss the 
indictment so that it could refile charges in a different judicial 
district, which caused the court to question the Government’s 
good faith.  In Wright’s case, the District Court made no 
finding that the Government’s desire to retry Wright was for 
an improper purpose. 
In addition, and significantly, neither Ingram nor 
Rossoff addressed the doctrine of separation of powers.  
Rather, each essentially relied on a general concept of fairness 
12 
the text that empowers a court to prohibit the Government from 
retrying a case.8   
B 
 
 Apparently aware that Rule 31 did not provide it with a 
basis to preclude a retrial in these circumstances, the District 
Court concluded that it had the inherent authority to forbid the 
retrial and dismiss the indictment.  The District Court erred. 
 
 The exercise of inherent authority must satisfy two 
requirements: (1) it “must be a reasonable response to the 
                                              
to the defendant in deciding to dismiss an indictment.  See 
Rossoff, 806 F. Supp. at 202; Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385-86.  
In this Circuit, however, “[t]he judiciary may not impose its 
personal and private notions of ‘fairness’ on law enforcement 
officials, but does have a limited authority to affect 
prosecutorial actions when those actions are taken in violation 
of the Constitution.”  United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 
596 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).    
8 Rule 31 differs from other Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure because it makes no mention of the court’s 
authority.  For instance, Rule 48(b) states that a court has 
authority to dismiss an indictment “if unnecessary delay occurs 
in: (1) presenting a charge to the grand jury; (2) filing an 
information against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to 
trial.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b).  There are other Rule-based 
grounds on which a district court could also dismiss an 
indictment, but each would be triggered by a motion, such as a 
motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 16’s 
discovery obligations if justice so requires, Fed. R. Crim. P. 
16(d)(2)(D), or a motion asserting a defect in the indictment, 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B).   
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problems and needs confronting the court’s fair administration 
of justice,” and (2) it “cannot be contrary to any express grant 
of or limitation on the district court’s power contained in a rule 
or statute.”  Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We will 
examine each of these requirements in turn. 
 
1 
 
As to the first Dietz requirement, “[g]uided by 
considerations of justice, and in the exercise of supervisory 
powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural 
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the 
Congress.”  United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Such rules 
must be imposed (1) “to implement a remedy for violation of 
recognized rights,” (2) “to preserve judicial integrity by 
ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations 
validly before the jury,” and (3) “as a remedy designed to deter 
illegal conduct.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Thus, a court may 
exercise its inherent authority only when it is necessary to 
address improper conduct and ensure respect for the 
proceedings.   
 
Under these principles, a court may dismiss an 
indictment based upon its inherent authority only if the 
Government engaged in misconduct, the defendant was 
prejudiced, and no less severe remedy was available to address 
the prejudice.  See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 
U.S. 250, 254-56, 263 (1988); Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1087 
(stating that “[a] court may dismiss an indictment under its 
supervisory powers only when the defendant suffers 
substantial prejudice and where no lesser remedial action is 
14 
available” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(observing that “a district court may not, in the management of 
its docket, exercise its discretion to dismiss an indictment with 
prejudice, either under Rule 48(b) or under its supervisory 
power, unless the violation caused prejudice to the defendant 
or posed a substantial threat thereof” (emphasis omitted)); 
United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799, 808 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that an indictment may not be dismissed for 
prosecutorial misconduct absent a showing that the misconduct 
prejudiced the defendants, and stating that “virtually every 
other circuit to consider the issue post-Hasting and Nova Scotia 
has also held that an indictment may not be dismissed based on 
prosecutorial misconduct, absent a showing of prejudice to the 
defendant”); United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 631-32 
(7th Cir. 1993) (“A federal judge is not authorized to punish 
the misconduct of a prosecutor by letting the defendant walk, 
unless the misconduct not only violated the defendant’s rights 
but also prejudiced his defense . . . .”); United States v. Tucker, 
8 F.3d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A] federal court may not 
exercise its supervisory authority to reverse a conviction or 
dismiss an indictment absent prejudice to the defendant.”); 
United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]aken 
together, [United States v. ]Payner, [447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980),] 
Hasting, and Bank of Nova Scotia form a trilogy admonishing 
federal courts to refrain from using the supervisory power to 
conform executive conduct to judicially preferred norms by 
dismissing charges, absent cognizable prejudice to a particular 
defendant.”); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (“Before it may invoke this [supervisory] power [to 
dismiss an indictment], a court must first find that the 
defendant is actually prejudiced . . . .”), amended by 43 F.3d 
1480 (9th Cir. 1994). 
15 
 
 In this case, there has been no misconduct.  Indeed, the 
District Court noted that the Government performed diligently 
and professionally in both trials, Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, 
at *4, and found that the evidence was sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright possessed the gun.  The 
District Court nonetheless applied its own predictions about 
what another jury may do when presented with the same 
evidence, emphasized the need for finality, and opined that the 
effect of prosecution on the defendant precluded a proper 
prosecution from proceeding.  See id. at *5-6.  Invoking its own 
notions about the unfairness of requiring a defendant to face a 
retrial where the Government did not obtain a majority of the 
jurors’ votes is an improper exercise of a court’s supervisory 
power.  United States v. Miller, 4 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1993).  
Moreover, there is no prejudice to a defendant simply because 
he faces the anxiety and the normal stress of undergoing a trial.  
See United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 
1975) (“[A]nxiety is present to some degree in virtually every 
case.  Something more than the normal anxiety that 
accompanies a trial is necessary to show a degree of 
prejudice.”); United States v. Clyburn, Crim. No. 89-0154 
(JHG), 1991 WL 45749, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 1991) (“The 
only real harm alleged is the general unfairness to these 
defendants in having to go forward yet again with a lengthy 
trial, in their being ‘ground down’ by the several months’ drain 
on their mental, emotional, and financial resources.  A lack of 
such fairness, however, does not alone violate due process.”).  
Rather, prejudice sufficient for the District Court to intervene 
in a proper prosecution based upon its inherent authority occurs 
only where the Government engages in actions that place a 
defendant at a disadvantage in addressing the charges.  That 
sort of prejudice is absent in this case.   
16 
  
 Unless there is some constitutional basis, such as a due 
process violation, it makes sense to limit a court’s authority to 
bar retrial to instances of prosecutorial misconduct and 
prejudice.  First, it ensures that a judge’s personal preferences 
about a case do not influence whether the case proceeds.  See 
United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 596 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“The judiciary may not impose its personal and private 
notions of ‘fairness’ on law enforcement officials, but does 
have a limited authority to affect prosecutorial actions when 
those actions are taken in violation of the Constitution.”).  
Second, as more fully discussed below, it guarantees that a 
court limits the Executive’s decision to prosecute only where 
there is a constitutionally sound reason to do so.9  This brings 
us to the second Dietz requirement. 
                                              
9 For these reasons, we find unpersuasive our dissenting 
colleague’s reliance on Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 
F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), and particularly its 
observation that a court has the inherent power to resolve a 
case, as authority for allowing a court dismiss an indictment 
after successive hung juries.  As a general matter, there is no 
doubt that a court has the authority to dismiss a case, but it may 
not simply end a case because it decides that it should not be 
tried again.  Rather, as Bank of Nova Scotia, Chapman, and 
their progeny make clear, the court must point to evidentiary 
deficiency, prejudicial misconduct, or a constitutional basis, 
such as double jeopardy or due process, to justify precluding a 
prosecution.  If a court believed that the evidence was deficient, 
the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct, or a retrial 
would violate the constitution, then it has a basis to preclude a 
retrial.  Requiring such reasons for barring a retrial ensures that 
17 
2 
 
 The second Dietz requirement reminds a court that the 
exercise of its powers must be in accordance with the 
Constitution, statutes, and rules.  136 S. Ct. at 1892.  Beginning 
with the Constitution, a court must be mindful of its role in our 
tripartite form of government and the doctrine of separation of 
powers.  Separation-of-powers principles limit a court’s 
inherent authority.  “Regardless of whether the supervisory 
power stems from the federal courts’ inherent power to check 
intrusions by other branches of government or whether it is a 
form of specialized federal common law, the separation-of-
powers principle imposes significant limits on it,” and 
“[p]roper regard for judicial integrity does not justify a 
‘chancellor’s foot veto’ over activities of coequal branches of 
government.”  United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)).   
 
 In the criminal context, the Executive Branch has 
“broad discretion as to whom to prosecute,” and this discretion 
“rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute 
is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”  Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A court is not equipped to evaluate  
 
[s]uch factors as . . . the prosecution’s general 
deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement 
priorities, and the case’s relationship to the 
                                              
the ruling is not based on a court’s own personal sense of 
whether a case is worthy of prosecution.   
 
18 
Government’s overall enforcement plan . . . .  
Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, 
entails systemic costs of particular concern.  
Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the 
criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law 
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s 
motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, 
and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness 
by revealing the Government’s enforcement 
policy.  All of these are substantial concerns that 
make the courts properly hesitant to examine the 
decision whether to prosecute. 
 
Id.; see also In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 786 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(echoing similar sentiments with respect to Rule 48(a) 
dismissals).  Thus, absent constitutional concerns, the decision 
to try or retry a case is at the discretion of the prosecutor.  
United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 129, 
137-38 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that the court’s “role is not to act 
as superprosecutors, second-guessing the legitimate exercise of 
core elements of prosecutorial discretion, but rather as neutral 
arbiters of the law” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 
1994) (“[T]he choice to forego permanently a prosecution is 
ordinarily made by the executive branch.”); Tucker, 8 F.3d at 
676 (“In maintaining order in our own house, we should not 
needlessly trample on the interest of the prosecutor and of the 
public in securing proper, lasting convictions.”); Isgro, 974 
F.2d at 1097 (stating that the doctrine of separation of powers 
“mandates judicial respect for the independence of the 
prosecutor,” and “[d]ismissal of an indictment with prejudice 
19 
is the most severe sanction possible”).10  Accordingly, 
separation-of-powers principles preclude a court from 
terminating a prosecution absent misconduct and prejudice to 
the defendant.  See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-56, 
263; Goodson, 204 F.3d at 514; Tucker, 8 F.3d at 674; Isgro, 
974 F.2d at 1094.   
 
 In short, a court’s power to preclude a prosecution is 
limited by the separation of powers and, specifically, the 
Executive’s law-enforcement and prosecutorial prerogative.  
See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08; HSBC, 863 F.3d at 137; In re 
Richards, 213 F.3d at 786; Raineri, 42 F.3d at 43; Tucker, 8 
F.3d at 676; Isgro, 974 F.2d at 1095-97; Santtini, 963 F.2d at 
596; Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1046.  Exercising inherent authority 
here to dismiss an indictment in the absence of misconduct and 
prejudice and based only on the fact that two juries could not 
reach a verdict intrudes on the Executive’s domain and thereby 
violates the separation of powers.  See, e.g., HSBC, 863 F.3d 
at 138; Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091.   
                                              
10 Several state courts have also refused to recognize 
any inherent authority to dismiss an indictment to prevent a 
retrial.  See People v. Sierb, 581 N.W.2d 219, 225 (Mich. 
1998); State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1991) (en banc); State v. Sherrod, 383 So.2d 752, 753 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).  Other states, however, have 
recognized a court’s authority to dismiss an indictment sua 
sponte.  See State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1167-68, 1167 n.1 
(Vt. 1995); Abbati, 493 A.2d at 521; Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 
712; Witt, 572 S.W.2d at 917.  These latter cases are 
unpersuasive because they give too little weight to the 
separation of powers, a crucial constitutional principle in the 
federal system. 
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 Finally, there is no statute or procedural rule that 
permits a court to bar a retrial in the absence of misconduct and 
prejudice.  First, a court may not dismiss an indictment as a 
method to manage its own affairs.11  See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 
505.  Second, a court’s inherent power does not “include the 
power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”  Carlisle v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996).  Barring a retrial through the 
exercise of inherent authority circumvents the absence of 
power of the district court to dismiss an indictment in Rule 
31(b).  As stated above, courts have inherent authority to 
dismiss indictments, including, for instance, for prosecutorial 
misconduct if the defendant was prejudiced, Bank of Nova 
Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-56, 263, but neither the Supreme Court 
nor our Court has extended a court’s inherent authority to allow 
                                              
11 In Chambers, for example, the Supreme Court 
recognized a court’s authority to impose silence, respect, and 
decorum based on its authority to manage its own affairs.  501 
U.S. at 43.  This authority has been exercised by controlling 
admission to the bar and disciplining its members; punishing 
for contempt, which penalizes disruption to proceedings and 
disobedience to court orders; disallowing fraud on the courts; 
ensuring the proceedings move forward; and curtailing 
litigation abuses.  Id. at 43-45; see also Link v. Wabash R.R. 
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962) (noting a court can dismiss a 
civil case for failure to prosecute to prevent delays and court 
congestion as part of a court’s inherent power to manage its 
own affairs).  Chambers and Link address how a court may 
manage its own proceedings, but they do not address how the 
court must also account for issues of separation of powers in 
the context of a criminal case. 
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the sua sponte dismissal of an indictment solely to preclude 
multiple mistrials following hung juries, see Chambers, 501 
U.S. at 47; HSBC, 863 F.3d at 136.12   
                                              
12 Most cases concerning a court’s inherent authority 
have arisen in the civil context.  See Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1893 
(noting a court’s inherent powers to rescind a jury discharge 
order and recall a jury); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 55-58 
(recognizing a court’s authority to vacate a judgment upon 
proof that a fraud was perpetrated on the court, and, in 
particular, to assess as a sanction the entire amount of the 
opposing party’s attorney’s fees); Link, 370 U.S. at 629-31 
(authority to dismiss a civil case sua sponte for failure to 
prosecute); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 
(1947) (dismissing an action based on the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens).  See generally Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892-93 
(citing cases involving the scope of a district court’s inherent 
power); Eash, 757 F.2d at 561-64 (same).   
There are other circumstances in which district courts 
lack the inherent authority to act, and most of those situations 
arise in the criminal context.  See, e.g., Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 
433 (holding that a court does not have authority to grant a 
post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, filed one day 
outside the time limit under Rule 29(e)); Williams, 504 U.S. at 
45-50, 55 (holding that a district court does not have inherent 
authority to dismiss an indictment because the Government 
failed to disclose to the grand jury substantial exculpatory 
evidence; “[b]ecause the grand jury is an institution separate 
from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not 
preside, we think it clear that, as a general matter at least, no 
such ‘supervisory’ judicial authority exists”); HSBC, 863 F.3d 
at 129, 135-37 (holding that the district court violated 
separation-of-powers principles by sua sponte invoking its 
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 Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in barring 
a retrial and dismissing the indictment. 13 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
for further proceedings.    
                                              
supervisory power to oversee the government’s entry into and 
implementation of a deferred prosecution agreement).   
13 Our dissenting colleague says that our approach 
deprives the court from taking action “when warranted to 
protect the institutional integrity of the judiciary.”  Dissent at 
3.  We disagree.  This approach recognizes a court’s role in our 
tripartite system of government and ensures that a court 
intercedes when proceeding would violate the Constitution.  
Furthermore, our approach does not preclude a court from 
ending a case where the evidence is insufficient or the conduct 
of the prosecution is improper.  
 
 
1 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 As I shall explain, I am sympathetic to what the District 
Court was trying to do in this case and I think I understand why 
the court acted as it did.  Moreover, I agree with Judge Nygaard 
insofar as he posits in dissent that a District Court can step in 
at some point and bar a retrial without infringing on the 
separation of powers.  Nevertheless, despite my belief that the 
separation of powers doctrine is not necessarily violated by a 
trial court barring a retrial after successive mistrials, and 
despite my belief that the District Court was trying to act in a 
manner that would assure a measure of justice for Wright, I 
concur in the judgment reversing the District Court.  I simply 
do not believe that the current state of the law supports the 
District Court’s action in the absence of prosecutorial 
misconduct, bad faith, or more than two unsuccessful trials.  
Since the record is clear that the District Court found neither 
prosecutorial misconduct nor bad faith, I concur in the 
judgment reversing the court’s order but feel compelled to 
write separately to explain why.  
I. 
 At the outset, it is important to note that I do not believe 
that a trial court lacks the power to, at some point, call a halt to 
successive prosecutions following deadlocked juries, and I do 
not read Judge Shwartz’s opinion as standing for that principle.  
The Government even conceded at oral argument that there 
could come a point where successive prosecutions become so 
onerous and burdensome that additional trials rise to the level 
of a Due Process violation which a trial court is clearly 
empowered to prevent.  Moreover, in Barkus v. Illinois,1 the 
Supreme Court noted that there “may” come a point where 
multiple prosecutions become so harassing that they violate the 
Due Process Clause.2    
 
Here the evidence in both trials consisted solely of 
police testimony.  According to the officers’ testimony, some 
residents of the community witnessed crucial parts of Wright’s 
encounter with the police, but they did not testify.  Similarly, 
Wright did not testify on his own behalf, nor did the defense 
put on a case.  His theory was that he had no way of knowing 
                                              
1 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
2 Id. at 127. 
2 
 
that the men in plain clothes and unmarked cars who began 
pursuing him were police; he panicked, sped away, and 
crashed; and police subsequently planted the gun at the scene.  
Wright also asserted that the officers chose not to test the gun 
for DNA or fingerprints because they knew the results would 
contradict their story.  In an effort to counter Wright’s 
argument from the first trial that police decided not to test the 
gun for fingerprints and DNA in order to hide their 
malfeasance, the Government called experts at the second trial 
“who testified about the difficulty of retrieving DNA and 
fingerprint evidence from firearms.”3 
 
Nevertheless, the Government’s case depended entirely 
on the testimony of police officers who had worked together 
for many years and/or knew one another.  Over the span of ten 
months, the District Court twice listened to the police 
testimony during the trials.  That testimony was at times 
contradictory and at other times strained credulity.  
  
At the first trial, Detective Fallert, who first noticed 
Wright speeding, testified that Wright was travelling at 90 
mph, but he did not note that in his police paperwork nor did 
he note it at the pretrial hearing.  His contemporaneously 
prepared investigative report also did not claim that Wright 
was initially speeding.  Detective Henson, who took over the 
chase, testified that he saw Wright holding a handgun, but 
conceded that he had no way of knowing whether Wright knew 
he was a police officer when the pursuit began.  Lastly, 
Detective Baker testified similarly to Henson, yet guessed that 
Wright had been going at a speed of 60 mph and accelerated.  
This is a very substantial discrepancy, especially for seasoned 
police officers who can be expected to have some expertise and 
experience in estimating the speed of an automobile. 
  
In the second trial, the Government called the same 
witnesses, with the exception of Detective Fallert.  Notably, 
this time Detective Henson testified he actually did not see 
Wright speeding.  Two different juries found themselves 
deadlocked—unable to convict or acquit.   
II. 
 The majority opinion suggests that the District Court’s 
                                              
3 Appellant Br. at 11. 
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decision to dismiss the indictment with prejudice 
impermissibly infringed upon the jury’s role.  Judge Shwartz 
states: “[t]he District Court nonetheless applied its own 
predictions about what another jury may do when presented 
with the same evidence,” and concluded that was “an improper 
exercise of a court’s supervisory power.”4  However, it is 
difficult to know whether the District Court ruled as it did 
based upon a belief that a third jury presented with the same 
evidence would be unable to reach a verdict or whether it 
simply shared the doubts that some of the jurors obviously had 
about the veracity of police officers’ testimony.   
     
In any event, either scenario poses exactly the same 
issue about a court overstepping its bounds and infringing on 
the role of a jury as well as prosecutorial discretion.  As I stated 
at the beginning, to the extent that a trial judge can intervene 
and dismiss an indictment, I am skeptical that this record 
supports such an assertion of judicial authority.  Nevertheless, 
there is more support for the judge’s actions here than our 
reversal suggests. 
  
It is not a novel proposition that a trial judge must 
“ensure that any and all . . . evidence is not only relevant, but 
also reliable.”5  “The trial judge’s role is to preside over the 
trial; passively if possible but aggressively when indicated.”6  
Thus, the law allows for trial courts to channel the jury’s 
judgment in certain circumstances.  Here, the court’s decision 
would prevent another jury from hearing the same evidence 
that has failed to convict Wright on two prior occasions.  
 
There are situations in which judges must act as 
“gatekeepers” and ensure the reliability of evidence before a 
jury is able to consider it.  Accordingly, in an admittedly very 
different context, the Supreme Court has described trial judges 
as gatekeepers of evidence.7  “[A] gatekeeping role for the 
                                              
4 Maj. Op. 13–14. 
5 Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (citing Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 
579, 589 (1993)). 
6 Holdnrook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 80 F.3d 777, 788 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
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judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will 
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and 
innovations.”8  
 
Despite the importance of the jury system, and the faith 
we place in juries, the law has thus traditionally recognized the 
danger that jurors may not be able to restrict their deliberations 
to admissible evidence and that they may return a verdict based 
on factors other than the evidence presented at trial.  For 
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows courts to 
prevent jurors from learning of certain testimony (even 
uncontradicted testimony) if the court concludes that the 
testimony could cause a jury to reach a verdict based more on 
emotion or prejudice than on evidence.9  
 
The best known example of how courts are empowered 
to limit what a jury can consider may well be the body of law 
that has developed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Daubert.  In Daubert, the Court stated: “the trial judge must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”10  We certainly 
could, but do not, allow the jury to determine whether the 
scientific evidence is reliable in the first instance based upon 
testimony at trial.  Instead, that preliminary factual 
determination rests solely with the trial court if the reliability 
is challenged.  
 
The difficulty with relying on this body of law here is, 
of course, the fact that the trial court’s dismissal of Wright’s 
indictment was not limited to an intrusion into the jury-box.  
More fundamentally, and more importantly, it also trespassed 
on the separation of powers, and concomitantly, on the 
prosecutorial discretion that is endemic in that concept.    
 
Despite Judge Nygaard’s thoughtful attempt to address 
that issue and the jury’s obvious concerns regarding the 
                                              
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 117, 121–23, 
(3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the probative value of video 
evidence of murder committed by coconspirators was 
substantially outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice). 
10Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
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testimony of police officers in this case, I am not convinced 
that the United States Supreme Court would agree that the 
inherent powers of a trial court are broad enough to justify what 
happened here.  
 
The Government clearly has the inherent authority to 
decide not to retry Wright given all of the circumstances in this 
case, including the seemingly improbable account of what 
happened,11 the conflicting nature of the police testimony and 
the jurors’ apparent trouble with it, the fact that there is no 
additional evidence to offer at a third trial, and Wright’s 
apparent steps toward rehabilitation since the offense which 
disqualified him from lawfully owning a firearm, as well as any 
other factors that the Government might appropriately 
consider.12  However, I can find no authority that convinces me 
that the United States Supreme Court would agree that a trial 
court’s inherent authority allows it to dismiss an indictment 
with prejudice on this record.  
 
III. 
 
                                              
11 According to the officers’ accounts, they watched (in the 
open and without cover) as Wright fumbled in the back of a 
car with tinted windows and came out holding a gun. They 
then continued to stand and watch from approximately 25 
yards away—without cover and without taking any actions to 
protect themselves—as he attempted to rack the slide which 
would have placed a bullet in the chamber. 
12 Appellee argues without contradiction that:  
 
[f]ollowing early involvement with the criminal 
justice system, Mr. Wright began to turn his life 
around, returning to school and earning his 
Associates degree in Computer Management-
Networking Engineering Technology[,] . . . a 
Bachelor of Science degree in Information 
Technology and Management . . . graduating 
cum laude[,] . . . and . . . a Master of Science 
degree.  
 
Appellee Br. at 52.  
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As I noted at the outset, the Government agrees that 
successive prosecutions can rise to the level of a Due Process 
violation, which a court clearly could remedy by dismissing an 
indictment.  However, the Government strenuously argues 
Wright’s prosecution has not yet reached that point.  The 
Government’s position inherently argues that the court’s action 
here is also not justified by any concept of fundamental 
fairness.  In Ake v. Oklahoma,13 the Supreme Court observed 
that the right to Due Process includes the “guarantee of 
fundamental fairness.”14  As has been discussed by Judge 
Shwartz, the District Court here relied on the decision of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Abbati.15  There, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of 
an indictment with prejudice after two juries deadlocked, 
resulting in mistrials.16  That situation is on “all fours” with the 
circumstances here and the District Court relied heavily on that 
decision to justify its action and fashion a rule that would 
properly allow a trial court to dismiss an indictment with 
prejudice under certain circumstances.17   
 
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court based its 
decision on the inherent authority of state courts under the New 
Jersey Constitution.18  It did not purport to rest its decision on 
the U.S. Constitution and, with very limited exception, it cited 
to state judicial decisions—not federal ones—in discussing 
when consecutive hung juries justified dismissing an 
indictment with prejudice.19  The holding of the Court is 
                                              
13 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
14 Id. at 76. 
15 493 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1985). 
16 Id. at 522. 
17 See United States v. Wright, Crim A No. 14-292, 2017 WL 
1179006, at *3, *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017). 
18 Abbati, 493 A.3d at 517–18. 
19 Abbati cited to Ake, for the general proposition that the 
“requirement of fundamental fairness [is] grounded in [the] 
fourteenth amendment’s due process guarantee.” 493 A.2d at 
518. However, with the exception of a single District Court 
case, the Court cited numerous state court cases for the 
proposition that a trial court had the inherent authority to 
dismiss an indictment with prejudice after two juries 
deadlocked. Id. at 519–20. It concluded by finding “[t]hese 
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summarized in its statement that the “judicial responsibility for 
the proper administration of criminal justice also gives rise to 
the inherent power to dismiss an indictment in appropriate 
circumstances.”20   
 
The Abbati standard has not been discussed by this 
Court (aside from in the instant case), let alone adopted by it.  
Although some of the factors used by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court are analogous to considerations federal courts have made 
in similar federal cases, such as United States v. Ingram21 and 
United States v. Rossoff,22 Abbati has no real corollary in 
federal case law.23 
                                              
examples of the courts’ exercise of their power to administer 
the criminal justice system assist in answering the further 
argument of the State that recognition of an inherent judicial 
power to dismiss an indictment with prejudice would overstep 
the separation of powers.” Id. at 520. Abbati dismissed that 
argument based upon its belief that “[t]he separation of 
powers is not an end in itself, but a general principle intended 
to ensure that the system of checks and balances remains 
vital.” Id. at 521 (citing State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 612 
(N.J. 1977)). 
20 Id. at 520.  
21 412 F. Supp. 384 (D.D.C. 1976). The District Court of the 
District of Columbia dismissed an indictment after two trials 
in which twenty-one of twenty-four jurors voted to acquit. 
The court found no prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 386. It 
instead considered the issue a “matter of fair play,” 
emphasizing that “[t]he Government has no new proof; it 
simply wants another chance” and “simply wishes to keep 
pressing so long as juries disagree in the hope that a 
conviction eventually will result.” Id. at 385. 
22 806 F. Supp. 200 (C.D. Ill. 1992). 
23 For example, the first prong of Abbati’s analysis concerns 
the number of mistrials and the outcome of the juries’ 
deliberations. 493 A.2d at 521.  Both Rossoff and Ingram took 
this into account in dismissing indictments. See Rossoff, 806 
F. Supp. at 203 (naming, as “additional compelling 
circumstances: 1) the majority of jurors in both cases found 
Dr. Rossoff Not Guilty; 2) if not for the allegedly biased juror 
in the second trial, Dr. Rossoff would have been acquitted on 
all counts; 3) the two trials have taken over one solid month 
8 
 
 Accordingly, as I noted at the outset, I am sympathetic 
to the District Court’s efforts given the totality of the 
circumstances here.  However, until Congress or the United 
States Supreme Court determines otherwise, I agree that we 
have no alternative but to enter judgment reversing the District 
Court.  I therefore concur in the judgment reversing the District 
Court’s order.  
                                              
of the Court’s time”); Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385 (“The 
proof was legally sufficient to support a conviction in each 
instance but the juries simply did not credit the witnesses, 
voting 10–2 and 11–1 for acquittal.”). 
 The Abbati standard is also based on the likelihood of 
any substantial difference in a subsequent trial, which the 
Ingram decision also considered.  See Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 
385 (“If another trial takes place there is every reason to 
believe the jury will again be divided or will acquit.”). 
 Finally, Rossoff and Ingram both made determinations 
similar to Abbati’s seventh prong, the status of the individual 
and the impact of a retrial upon the defendant in terms of 
untoward hardship and unfairness.  483 A.2d at 422; see 
Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385–86 (“Here is a man in jail now 
more than seven months primarily because of an offense 
which the Government is unable to convince a jury he 
committed. . . . To permit a retrial, after 21 of 24 jurors have 
already refused to convict, is to ignore the reasonable doubt 
standard.”); Rossoff, 806 F. Supp. at 203 (“Dr. Rossoff is 71 
years of age and in poor health. He has had heart surgery, 
suffers from severe anemia and at the time of the second trial 
was on experimental treatment. He has been under great 
physical and emotional strain as the result of these repeated 
trials and was even hospitalized immediately following the 
second trial.”). 
 
 1 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
 This appeal presents us with two issues: First, does a 
district court possess the inherent power to dismiss an 
indictment after serial hung juries, and second, did the 
District Court here abuse its discretion by dismissing this 
indictment after two of them.  I answer yes to the first and no 
to the second.  Because I view this to be a matter of 
substantial importance, I must respectfully dissent.1 
 
 As the majority notes, twice now, the Government has 
tried Raymont Wright for a violation of federal law: being a 
felon in possession of a firearm.2  Twice now, the 
Government has done so on the basis of essentially the same 
evidence at trials presided over by the same District Court.  
And twice now, two different juries could not reach a verdict.  
Thus, when the Government announced its intention to put 
Wright on trial for the third time, the District Court was 
skeptical. It asked for briefing on whether it possessed the 
inherent power to prohibit the Government from taking a 
third turn, and if it did, whether the court should use that 
                                                          
1 Whether the District Court had the inherent power to 
dismiss the indictment is a legal question.  We employ a 
plenary standard of review to that issue.  See United States v. 
Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States 
v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Whether the 
District Court appropriately exercised this power is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.  Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 633 (1962). 
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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power.3  After hearing from both sides, the District Court 
concluded that its inherent power applied to this 
circumstance.  It then exercised its discretion to dismiss the 
indictment.   
 
Neither the Government nor the majority disputes that 
district courts have the inherent authority to dismiss 
indictments under at least some circumstances.  Citing to 
United States v. Hasting,4 however, the majority cabins that 
authority to those instances in which there is evidence of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  In my view, in so doing, the 
majority conflates and confuses the various powers of the 
court.  And it also hobbles the court’s discretion to probe the 
impact on the fair administration of justice of those 
prosecutorial decisions that sit outside the definition of bad 
conduct but still pose—or threaten to pose—real institutional 
harm. 
 
  The executive office inheres prosecutors with the 
power to bring a case to trial.  The judicial office, on the other 
hand, inheres the court with the power to end a case.5  Both 
                                                          
3 The District Court ordered the parties to “file cross briefs 
stating their position regarding whether the Court, through an 
exercise of its inherent authority, should prohibit or permit a 
second re-trial in this case.”  United States v. Wright, No. 14-
cr-292, 2017 WL 1179006, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2017). 
4 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).   
5 See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 
816 (1987)(Scalia, J. concurring)(“The judicial power is the 
power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail 
in a case or controversy.  See Art. III, § 2. . . . [S]ince the 
prosecution of law violators is part of the implementation of 
 3 
 
offices share a responsibility to safeguard the overall integrity 
of the judicial process.  But when a prosecutor decides to 
proceed with another trial in the aftermath of multiple 
mistrials, who but the court is empowered to question the 
impact of the prosecutor’s discretion on the fair 
administration of justice, particularly when the court has 
concerns that the proceedings—and the institution—will be 
tainted by the abuse of jury shopping?  It could be argued that 
two mistrials may not in some instances be enough to inflict 
serious institutional damage.  But, the majority’s combined 
reliance on Dietz v. Bouldin6 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b)(3) to 
allow the prosecutor to bring an unlimited number of retrials, 
so long as she or he does not stray into the realm of “illegal 
conduct,” provides the prosecutor with an unchecked power.  
This poses a threat to the integrity of the judiciary and 
contradicts the inherent responsibility and authority vested in 
the judiciary by the framers of the Constitution.  Thus, it is 
the majority’s decision—and not the District Court’s exercise 
of its inherent authority—that violates the separation of 
power principles on which the majority relies.  We must 
affirm that our trial court judges have the discretion, 
originating in the court’s inherent power, to take proper 
action when warranted to protect the institutional integrity of 
the judiciary.   
 
Here, the District Court mindfully struck the balance 
that is necessary anytime the power of the court and the 
power of the prosecutor intersect.  Drawing from factors set 
                                                                                                                                  
the laws, it is—at least to the extent that it is publicly 
exercised—executive power, vested by the Constitution in the 
President.”)  (footnote omitted)).   
6 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016). 
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out in State v. Abbati,7 the District Court identified and 
investigated a circumstance that it identified as harmful to the 
institution and to the defendant:  jury shopping.  It also took 
note of the impact of serial retrials on the defendant.  It then 
properly dismissed the indictment.  Its use of the court’s 
inherent discretion did not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.  To the contrary, it gave definition and substance to 
it. 
 
I. 
 Some review is appropriate to illuminate how and 
possibly why I believe the majority confuses the court’s 
various powers.   
 
A. 
Federal courts operate within a constitutional system 
that enumerates the powers of each branch of government, as 
set forth in the founding document.   Article I restrains 
congressional power to those “legislative Powers granted 
herein.”8  By comparison, Article II vests the President with 
“the executive Power” without further description, limitation, 
or restriction.9  Analogous to Article II, Article III conveys 
without restriction or limitation the “judicial Power” to 
federal courts.10  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has—since 
at least 1812—recognized that “[c]ertain implied powers must 
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of 
                                                          
7 493 A.2d 513, 521-22 (N.J. 1985).   
8 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
9 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
10 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
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their institution.”11  “The moment the courts of the United 
States were called into existence and invested with 
jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of” 
inherent authority.12  
  
Moreover, two bedrock purposes of the Constitution—
checking the actions of the states and ensuring that Congress 
and the Executive do not overstep their boundaries—require a 
federal judiciary that exercises its own independent judicial 
power.  That is, it would be impossible for federal courts to 
discharge these vital duties if they lacked some inherent 
power beyond the reach of the Executive or the legislature.  I 
think of it this way: the elaborate measures set out in the 
Constitution to protect the independence of the judiciary (life 
tenure, removal from office only through impeachment, no 
decrease in salary during a judge’s tenure, for example) 
would be meaningless if there were not some inherent, 
unimpeachable power vested solely in the federal courts. 
 
In Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.,13 we defined inherent 
power as vesting in federal courts upon their creation and as 
not deriving from any statute.  In this sense, the “judicial 
power” given to the federal courts by Article III of the 
Constitution is the “power to decide, in accordance with law, 
who should prevail in a case or controversy.”14  No matter the 
description, this power is intrinsic to the judicial office and 
cannot be inhibited by any rule or act of Congress.  As we 
                                                          
11 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).   
12 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (speaking of 
the inherent contempt power). 
13 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
14 Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 6 
 
have recognized, the boundaries of this power are often 
“nebulous” and “shadowy,”15 and “it is not always possible to 
categorize inherent power.”16  Yet, we have an outline.  
 
In Eash, we identified three main classes or categories 
of inherent power:  1) inherent powers based in Article III, 
that is, the power of a lower federal court to decide a case 
over which it has jurisdiction; 2) those powers “necessary to 
the exercise of all others,”17 and 3) powers that include those 
reasonably useful to achieve justice, which are “necessary 
only in the practical sense of being useful.”18  Focusing on the 
first category, the inherent power to decide a case is “so 
fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional 
tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within 
this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the 
terms ‘court’ and ‘judicial power.’”19  In other words, powers 
                                                          
15 Eash, 757 F.2d at 561 (citation omitted). 
16 Id. at 562. 
17 Id. (quoting Roadway Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
764 (1980)). 
18 Id. at 563; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 
673 F.3d 245, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Eash factors); 
In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam) (adopting Eash factors).  In Chambers v. NASCO 
Inc., the Supreme Court was urged to adopt our approach to 
inherent powers.  But the Court held that it “ha[d] never so 
classified the inherent powers and . . . ha[d] no need to do so 
now.”  501 U.S. 32, 47 n.12 (1991).   
19 Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.  The third aspect of a court’s 
inherent power is its authority to employ persons or 
instruments not connected with the court, such as experts and 
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in this category make a court a court; they are encoded into 
the judiciary’s DNA.  Courts have referred to this power as a 
court’s “irreducible inherent authority”20 and “the core Article 
III power.”21  It is nothing less than our ability to decide a 
case over which we have jurisdiction, without interference by 
Congress or the Executive.22   
 
Drawing from this, when I refer to a district court’s 
inherent power, I mean a ‘“[c]ertain implied power[] [that] 
must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the 
nature of their institution,’ [a] power[] ‘which cannot be 
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the 
exercise of all others.’”23  It is “grounded in the separation of 
powers concept,” since to deny it and yet maintain an 
independent judiciary “is a self-contradiction.”24   
 
However, that is not to say that the court operates 
solely outside the realm of legislatively granted judicial 
                                                                                                                                  
auditors, to assist in its decision-making function.  This facet 
of inherent power is not in play here. 
20 Id.  
21 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d at 256. 
22 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871), 
Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 (noting that courts may exercise this 
type of inherent power despite legislation to the contrary); see 
also Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 
O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 64 (1924) (acknowledging that the 
Constitution vests courts with some powers unalterable by 
legislation). 
23 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) at 34.). 
24 Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.  
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powers.25  In fact, the categorization scheme in Eash was 
intended largely as a means of explaining the relationship 
between inherent judicial powers and legislatively granted 
judicial powers.26  It is here that I believe the majority’s 
analysis strays.   
 
B. 
The majority, the briefs, and the discussion at oral 
argument reveal what has become a commonplace but 
imprecise conflation of the terms “inherent power” and 
“supervisory power.”27  The Government, while referencing 
the District Court’s “inherent power,” also referred to the 
court’s “supervisory power,” and its “inherent supervisory 
judicial authority.”28  The Appellee covers the entire panoply, 
citing the District Court’s “supervisory authority,” its 
                                                          
25 See Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33.   
26 See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 
384 n.14 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999). 
27 In Eash, we noted that “[t]he conceptual and definitional 
problems regarding inherent power . . . have bedeviled 
commentators for years,” 757 F.2d at 561, and that “those 
cases that have employed inherent power appear to use that 
generic term to describe several distinguishable court 
powers,” id. at 562.  We also noted that “this lack of 
specificity [has been compounded by courts] rel[ying] . . . on 
precedents involving one form of power to support the court’s 
use of another.”  Id. 
28 E.g., Appellant’s Br. at 13, 16; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2, 
14. 
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“supervisory power,” and its “inherent power.”29  At times, 
we too have been guilty of adding to the confusion.30  The 
erroneous interchangeability of these terms clouds an 
important distinction that is crucial to this appeal: the 
difference between inherent judicial powers and legislatively 
granted judicial powers.31  As noted supra, inherent “judicial 
power” is given to the federal courts by Article III of the 
Constitution.32  Through this grant, federal courts receive the 
“power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail 
in a case or controversy.”33  The merging of the terms 
“inherent” and “supervisory” likely has its genesis in the fact 
that some inherent powers are supervisory in function, such 
as a federal court’s inherent power “to supervise the 
administration of criminal justice.”34 
                                                          
29 E.g., Appellee’s Br. at 22, 26. 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 396 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (speaking of our “inherent 
supervisory power”); see also United States v. Watkins, 339 
F.3d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 2003) (Nygaard, J., concurring) 
(referring to both a court’s supervisory power and inherent 
power to dismiss a case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b)). 
31 In re Tutu Wells Litig., 120 F.3d at 384 n. 14. 
32 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.   
33 Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
34 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) 
(quotation marks omitted); see also Sara Sun Beale, 
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases; 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits of the Federal Courts, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 1433, 1433-34, 1465, 1470 (1984) 
(identification of Article III “judicial power,” not 
congressional acts, as the source of the Supreme Court’s 
supervisory authority). 
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However, unlike inherent powers, a court’s 
supervisory authority may come from, and can be limited by, 
acts of Congress or a court’s own rules.35  Supervisory power 
often speaks to the power “to mandate ‘procedures deemed 
desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice.’”36  A 
court’s use of supervisory power can usually be classified in 
one of three ways.  First, supervisory power can refer to an 
appellate court’s supervision of a district court, through the 
imposition of procedures in addition to those already imposed 
by federal statute or constitutional provision.37  We have, for 
example, relied on our supervisory power over district courts 
to review the application of local rules of practice and 
procedure.38  We have also used our supervisory power to 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 
(1943); Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505. 
36 United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 780 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985)). 
37 See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 384 (2003) 
(instructing district courts to notify pro se litigants about 
consequences of re-characterizing motions as ones seeking 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 
217, 225 (1946) (announcing a new rule for the composition 
of federal juries); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 
816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (prescribing procedures for 
motions to dismiss based on the conduct of a litigant’s 
counsel); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1137-38 
(3d Cir. 1977) (requiring district courts to state reasons for a 
criminal sentence). 
38 See United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204-05 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
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prohibit certain jury instructions in the district courts39 and to 
review attorney-client fee arrangements.40  Second, Courts—
both trial and appellate—also refer to their “supervisory 
power” when meaning their power to supervise pending 
litigation.41  They can, for example, seal and unseal records,42 
reassign a case to a different judge on remand,43 or disqualify 
an attorney on ethical grounds.44  Lastly, the power of a 
federal court to supervise law enforcement officials can also 
be what a court intends when it speaks of its “supervisory 
                                                          
39 See United States v. E. Med. Billing Inc., 230 F.3d 600, 
607-12 (3d Cir. 2000). 
40 See Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 
210, 214 (3d Cir. 1999). 
41 See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425-26 
(1996) (acknowledging “supervisory power” of district courts 
over litigation before them). 
42 See, e.g., Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
43 See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 
376 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that, “[a]lthough it is the standard 
practice in the district courts and in this circuit that a case on 
remand is assigned to the judge who originally heard it, we 
can, in the exercise of our supervisory power, reassign this 
case to a different judge upon remand.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
44 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 447 F. Supp. 2d 453, 456-
57 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (collecting cases); see also United States 
v. Moreno, 809 F.3d at 780 (summarizing supervisory 
authority). 
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power.”45  These powers broadly ensure that pending cases 
are managed uniformly and efficiently.  
 
I concede that the boundary between supervisory 
authority that is inherent to the court and that which is granted 
by the legislature can, at times, be difficult to identify.  
However, these difficulties are irrelevant to this case because 
I conclude that the District Court here acted pursuant to its 
inherent power and not to any authority conferred by any 
statute or rule.  The District Court’s action was not 
undertaken in supervision of pending litigation—two trials 
were already concluded and a potential third trial had not yet 
begun.  Nor was it exercised according to a rule of procedure 
or practice newly announced by an appellate tribunal.  
Moreover, its action was not a response to any prosecutorial 
misconduct or request from Wright to dismiss the indictment.  
There is simply no basis to conclude that the inherent power 
that the District Court exercised in this case derived from any 
legislative grant.   
 
To the contrary, the specific power under review here 
is the power to dismiss an indictment after two mistrials 
because of deadlocked juries in each instance.  This power 
falls within Eash’s first category of power because it is an 
inherent power to resolve a case.  A court, by its nature, must 
be able to dismiss with prejudice actions brought before it, 
just as it must have the power to decide cases and enter 
                                                          
45 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 763 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  For a comprehensive discussion of the origins 
and uses of supervisory power, see Amy Coney Barrett, The 
Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 
324, 330 (2006). 
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judgments.46   Such exercises of power are fundamental to the 
essence of a court.  Were they not, the judicial system simply 
could not function.47   
 
The inherent power to dismiss is “of ancient origin, 
having its roots in judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur 
entered at common law,” and so is a power that is part of the 
very nature of the judicial institution.48  It is incidental and 
necessary to the fair and efficient operation of the courts.49  
Indeed, “the power to dismiss exists in many situations.  For 
example, a district court has the inherent power to dismiss sua 
sponte for lack of jurisdiction, or under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens.”50  Because the power to resolve a case by 
dismissing an indictment (in a criminal action) or a complaint 
(in a civil action) is fundamental to the essence of a court of 
justice, it cannot be interfered with.  Indeed, as two 
commentators have explained, “McNabb, other Supreme 
                                                          
46 We have also noted that our power to remand is a subset of 
the inherent power to dismiss a case.  See Bradgate Assocs., 
Inc. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d. 745, 750 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
47 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 
221 F.3d 362, 363-364 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding a district court 
has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it 
determines that the action is frivolous or the court lacks 
jurisdiction over the matter). 
48 Link, 370 U.S. at 630. 
49 See, e.g., Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 333 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Derzack v. County of 
Allegheny, 173 F.R.D. 400, 411 (W.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d 
without op., 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
50 In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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Court cases, and an analysis of several lower court opinions 
addressing this precise issue should sufficiently dispel any 
notion that the federal courts lack the power to bar repeated 
attempts to obtain a conviction” following serial mistrials.51  
Thus, the District Court’s action here was well within the 
boundaries of its inherent power.   
 
Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that “inherent 
authority,” “supervisory power,” and “supervisory authority” 
all refer to the same thing (while understandable given the 
rampant muddled references that persist) ultimately misses 
the point.  The power at issue here is the inherent power of 
the court to decide a case:  a power that is limited by the 
boundaries of reason and discretion and is subject to appellate 
review for abuse.  It is not subject to the power of Congress 
or the Executive.  
 
II. 
There is no dispute that district courts have the 
inherent power to dismiss indictments in at least some 
circumstance.  The majority nevertheless concludes that the 
District Court lacked the power to do so in this case.  The 
majority reaches that conclusion for three principal reasons, 
but none withstands scrutiny. 
 
A. 
                                                          
51
 Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, The Power of 
the Judiciary to Dismiss Criminal Charges After Several 
Hung Juries: A Proposed Rule to Control Judicial Discretion, 
30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 535, 543 & nn. 42-43 (1997) (collecting 
cases). 
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First, the majority agrees with the Government’s 
argument that the District Court’s dismissal violated the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine.  I agree that the District 
Court’s dismissal implicates the separation of powers.  But its 
actions were in furtherance—not in violation—of the 
doctrine.  The separation of powers doctrine refers to the 
balance among the branches of Government which prevents 
one branch from disrupting the constitutional functions of 
another.52  
 
Here, the majority concludes that, in dismissing the 
indictment after two hung juries, the District Court 
encroached on the independence of the Executive because it 
prohibited the prosecution from exercising its constitutional 
duty to enforce the laws of the United States.  Certainly, the 
United States Attorney, as a member of the Executive Branch, 
has such a responsibility.53  And, just as certainly, the 
decision to prosecute “is soundly within the discretion of the 
prosecutor, not the courts.”54  The Government’s authority 
not to prosecute a case is clear as well.55  But we see no sign 
that the District Court did anything to prevent the 
Government from fulfilling its duty.  To the contrary, the 
Government was twice given a full and fair opportunity to 
                                                          
52 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699-700 (1997); 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); Nixon v. Adm’r 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977); Baraka v. 
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 2007). 
53 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
54 United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 997 (6th Cir. 1999). 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 255-56 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
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present its case and makes no claim that the District Court 
ever prevented it from doing so.  Having had those 
opportunities, the Government had no absolute right as a 
matter of separation of powers or otherwise to try again.  As 
two commentators have explained, a district court’s use of its 
inherent power to dismiss an indictment after serial mistrials 
does not raise “significant separation of powers concerns” 
because the nature of that inherent power means that federal 
courts “need not automatically defer to a prosecutor’s 
decision to retry a defendant” in this situation.56 
 
The majority nevertheless concludes that prosecutors 
have the unimpeded right to try persons for violating federal 
law based on an indictment as many times as they wish and 
that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits a federal court 
from interfering.  This position is untenable because it is not a 
true reflection of the separation of powers.  It is axiomatic 
that no one branch of government is completely divorced 
from the other two.  In reality, “our constitutional system 
imposes on the Branches a degree of overlapping 
responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as 
independence.”57  This overlap becomes problematic, of 
course, when it results in an encroachment (when an action of 
one branch might undermine the independence of another 
branch) or an aggrandizement (where one branch seeks 
“powers more appropriately diffused among separate 
Branches”).58 
                                                          
56
 Berch & Berch, supra note 51, at 544. 
57 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). 
58 Id. at 381; see also In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 
285 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring). 
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But recognizing a district court’s right to prohibit a 
retrial following serial mistrials does not implicate these 
concerns.  To the contrary, and putting the shoe on the other 
foot, the Government’s position that nothing limits its 
opportunity to try and retry a defendant as many times as it 
chooses violates the judicial branch’s constitutional mandate 
to exercise its judicial power.  Just as the filing of an 
indictment is an exercise of executive power, the dismissal of 
one is an exercise of judicial power.  The unlimited serial 
prosecutions that the Government advocates for, and that the 
majority permits, would limit a court’s authority to dismiss an 
indictment to only those instances in which the prosecutor 
steps outside the bounds of professional conduct.  But our 
independence as an institution of government must include an 
ability to adjudicate, and thus dismiss with prejudice, 
individual cases when a district court, in its discretion, has 
concerns about the impact of serial retrials on the institution 
and the defendant.  We view the prosecution of a defendant 
after deadlocked juries as a tipping point in balancing the 
separation of powers.  As the repeated prosecutions increase, 
so too does the judiciary’s power to limit them.  As we stated 
in Eash, and as we said supra, a court’s exercise of its 
inherent power to dismiss an indictment after retrials does not 
violate the separation of powers but is grounded in it.59   
 
B. 
Second, and relatedly, the majority concludes that the 
District Court’s dismissal was in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
31(b)(3), which the majority claims confers on prosecutors 
the unlimited discretion to retry defendants following serial 
                                                          
59 See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. 
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mistrials.  Rule 31 does nothing of the kind.  Rule 31 provides 
in relevant part that “if a jury cannot agree on a verdict on one 
or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on those 
counts.  The government may retry any defendant on any 
counts on which the jury could not agree.”60  The Supreme 
Court adopted this rule in its original form in 1944 as a 
“restatement of existing law.”61  The Supreme Court itself 
appears never to have cited Rule 31(b)(3), and neither the few 
Courts of Appeals to have done so62 nor its Advisory 
Committee Notes have discussed its history or purpose in any 
detail.  Arguably, the rule’s reference to the prosecutor’s 
general ability to retry a defendant following a mistrial may 
be nothing more than a recognition of the longstanding 
principle that retrials following mistrials are not prohibited by 
the Double Jeopardy Clause,63 which is not at issue here. 
 
In any event, this rule does not by its terms prohibit 
district courts from dismissing indictments following serial 
mistrials.  District courts have the inherent power to do so as 
explained above.  A district court’s exercise of that power 
could be contrary to Rule 31(b)(3) only if the rule contained 
an “express grant of or limitation on” that power.64  It does 
not.  The rule does not mandate a retrial after a mistrial.  Nor 
                                                          
60
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b)(3).   
61
 Id. advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption. 
62 See United States v. Melendez, 775 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 
2014); United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106, 1111 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Gotti, 451 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
63 See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). 
64 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892. 
 19 
 
does it contain any other limitation on the district court’s 
power to prohibit one.  In fact, the rule does not even mention 
that issue.65  Thus, as  the Supreme Court has noted in 
addressing other rules of court, “[i]t would require a much 
clearer expression of purpose than [this rule] provides for us 
to assume that it was intended to abrogate” the district courts’ 
inherent power.66  Put simply, when there have been multiple 
mistrials and the prosecutor seeks to try the case again, Rule 
31(b)(3) does not purport to reduce the role of the district 
courts to that of a rubber stamp. 
 
C. 
 Finally, the majority claims that a district court can 
exercise its inherent power to dismiss an indictment only if 
there is evidence of willful bad faith or prosecutorial 
misconduct on the part of the government and resultant 
prejudice to the defendant.  It cites to numerous decisions that 
it says supports this position.67  But none of these cases deals 
                                                          
65 The majority claims that Rule 31(b)(3)’s silence on this 
issue supports the proposition that district courts lack the 
authority to dismiss an indictment following serial mistrials.  
But because district courts have the inherent power to do so 
as explained above, the question is not whether Rule 31(b)(3) 
permits district courts to dismiss an indictment in that 
circumstance.  The question instead is whether Rule 31(b)(3) 
prohibits them from doing so.  It does not. 
66 Link, 370 U.S. at 631-32. 
67 See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 
254-56, 263 (1988); United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 
1073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Goodson, 204 
F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Derrick, 163 
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with the particular circumstance we face here:  the decision to 
retry a defendant after serial mistrials.68  In fact, many are 
dismissals due to prosecutorial misconduct.  The majority’s 
reliance on such decisions is misplaced because it ignores the 
fact that the dismissal in this case was not punitive in nature; 
it was not a sanction for misconduct.69  As two commentators 
have explained, “[a]lthough the inherent power principle has 
usually involved cases of misconduct by the parties or a 
vindication of statutory principles, the doctrine is not so 
limited.”70  To the contrary, courts may use their inherent 
authority to dismiss indictments whenever necessary to 
vindicate “principles of fairness to the defendant and the 
interests of the public in the effective administration of 
justice.”71   
 
That is just what the District Court did here.  The 
Government asked the District Court to dismiss without 
prejudice “[e]ven if this court were inclined to dismiss the 
case.”72  Yet the Government proffered no additional 
                                                                                                                                  
F.3d 799, 808 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 
673, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United States v. Van 
Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Isgro, 
974 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1992).   
68 Derrick does deal with a dismissal of the indictment after 
an initial grant of a retrial, but the circumstance differs from 
this case because the mistrials were not due to deadlocked 
verdicts. See 163 F.3d at 803 
69 Cf., e.g., Isgro, 974 F.2d at 1097. 
70
 Berch & Berch, supra note 51, at 548. 
71 Id. 
72 Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *7. 
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evidence it would present if Wright was re-indicted.  It asked 
to try the same case again before a third jury, merely hoping 
for a different result.  The District Court’s dismissal of the 
indictment with prejudice was based on the merits, or lack 
thereof, of the Government’s request, no more and no less.   
 
Moreover, the dismissal was not, as the majority 
contends, a general declaration of unfairness simply because 
the government failed to obtain a conviction.73  Nor was it 
merely an attempt to shield the defendant from the anxiety of 
a retrial.74  Reference to Miller and Shepherd misconstrues 
not only the circumstance of this case, but also the gravity of 
the District Court’s concern.  As I discuss next, the District 
Court weighed many factors, mindful of the importance of 
each, before making its decision.  From all of this—even 
taking into account the separation of powers and Rule 
31(b)(3)—it is evident to me that the District Court correctly 
concluded it had the inherent authority to act upon the 
prosecutor’s decision to retry this case in the wake of two 
mistrials.75      
                                                          
73 See United States v. Miller, 4 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1993).   
74 See United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 
1975); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 
(1978).   
75 Although we conclude that the District Court appropriately 
exercised its inherent power as a court of law to dismiss an 
indictment, thus placing its actions within Eash’s first 
category, the District Court appeared at one point to tether its 
dismissal to its “inherent authority to effectuate . . . the 
speedy and orderly administration of justice and to ensure 
fundamental fairness.”  Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *2.  
These actions are typically associated with the second 
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III. 
 Before moving to the actual merits of the District 
Court’s decision, a word of caution is in order.  Just because a 
court has inherent power to dismiss an indictment after a 
retrial does not mean it should always be exercised.76  My 
dissenting opinion today should not be interpreted as an 
endorsement of unchecked and ungrounded judicial power.  
Nor should it be interpreted as permitting district courts in 
this Circuit to dismiss indictments without a significant basis 
for doing so.  Moreover, nothing in this opinion should be 
read as limiting reprosecution to two trials.  Cases no doubt 
exist where a third or fourth trial on the same indictment may 
be appropriate where the evidence so indicates.  It is simply 
my conclusion that, in some cases, and in the proper exercise 
of its discretion, a district court has the inherent power to 
prohibit continued re-prosecution by dismissing an 
indictment. 
 
IV. 
This is such a case.  The District Court here rightly 
proceeded with the Government’s request for another trial 
with deliberate caution.  Recognizing the lack of guidance 
                                                                                                                                  
classification of Eash’s powers.  See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-
563.  Nonetheless, it invoked the inherent power of the court 
and dismissed the case and it is on this basis that I conclude 
the District Court did not reach the boundaries of its power.   
76 See Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); see 
also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“Because of their very 
potency and discretion, inherent powers must be exercised 
with restraint and discretion.”).  
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from this Court, the District Court turned to a decision of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey.  In State v. Abbati,77 that court 
listed several factors a trial court should consider before 
dismissing an indictment after several hung juries.  These 
factors are valid inquiries and include 
 
 the number of previous mistrials and the 
outcome of the juries’ deliberations, as far as 
can be determined; 
 the character or nature of the previous trials, 
considering their length, complexity of issues, 
and similarities in evidence; 
 the probability that any subsequent trial will be 
much different from the previous ones; 
 the relative strength of the party’s case, as 
determined by the trial court; 
 the conduct of counsel during the previous 
trials.78 
 
In considering these factors, a district court must also accord 
appropriate weight to the Government’s decision to continue 
prosecution, giving deliberate consideration to the reasons for 
that choice.79   
 
Other considerations might include the seriousness of 
the crimes charged, the public’s interest in the effective 
resolution of criminal charges, and the criminal defendant’s 
circumstances, including the impact that continued 
prosecution might have on him or her and the potential for 
                                                          
77 493 A.2d 513. 
78 Id. at 521-22. 
79 See id. 
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unfairness or unnecessary hardship.80  The factors just 
outlined are not an exhaustive list and district courts could 
consider other things that are reasonably useful in answering 
whether further prosecutions after deadlocked juries should 
be permitted.  Moreover, all of these elements of inquiry 
enable the court to assess the impact that a serial retrial has on 
the integrity of the judiciary as an institution. 
   
 These avenues of inquiry make sense to me.  Take 
differences in evidence, for example.  If the evidence would 
be different at a retrial, then there seems little chance that 
continued prosecution should be curtailed.  If, on the other 
hand, there would be no substantial difference in evidence, 
concern about re-prosecution is appropriate.  So too the 
number of deadlocked juries is an important consideration.  
Continued prosecution after two, three, or even four 
deadlocked juries could unbalance the scale.  By inquiring 
into the seriousness of the charges, a district court could 
compare the crime being prosecuted to other cases when a 
court dismissed an indictment after deadlocked juries.    In 
other words, a district court must make sufficient findings and 
establish a sufficient record supporting its decision, thus 
enabling a court of appeals to accurately assess whether the 
district court abused its discretion or not.   That is what the 
District Court did here. 
 
 I see no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 
exercise of its inherent powers.  The District Court’s ruling 
was not arbitrary and instead was based on a thorough, 
careful, and balanced consideration of the above factors.  The 
District Court first acknowledged the weight of its actions 
                                                          
80 See id. 
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within our constitutional scheme.  It then found that the 
evidence suggested that the deadlock was not the result of a 
lone holdout.  As to the character of the preceding trials, the 
District Court noted the Government’s position that this was a 
“simple” case.  It also stated that both previous trials were 
“virtual duplicates” and that counsel on both sides was the 
same for both prosecutions.  The District Court further 
observed the lack of any allegation of jury nullification or 
bias.  Instead, it found that “there is every indication that the 
two juries engaged in deliberations in good faith, and, despite 
their best efforts, were unable to reach a verdict.” 
   
 The District Court also considered the strength of the 
parties’ respective cases and determined that its opinion on 
this factor was irrelevant, given that two separate juries had 
concluded that the Government failed to meet its burden of 
proof.  It commended the professionalism and hence the 
effectiveness of counsel on all sides, which it weighted as 
favoring disallowing any further prosecution.  The District 
Court specifically considered the seriousness of the crime 
charged, and it noted that other courts had dismissed 
indictments when the charges were far graver.81  Lastly, the 
District Court thoroughly balanced the Government’s 
authority to prosecute against the effect of continued 
prosecution on Wright.  Recognizing that Wright has been on 
bond since July of 2014, and on home detention for nearly 
two years, the District Court concluded that this inquiry 
tipped in his favor.   
                                                          
81 Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *6 (citing United States v. 
Ingram, 412 F. Supp. 384, 385 (D.D.C. 1976); State v. 
Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 708 (Haw. 1982); Abbati, 493 A.2d 
at 517; and State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1978)). 
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V. 
In conclusion, I see no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s careful and thorough balancing of relevant 
factors, a balancing which led it to invoke its inherent power 
and to dismiss the Government’s indictment of Wright.  For 
all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent from my esteemed 
colleagues in the majority.  I would affirm. 
